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Abstract 
 
We study mechanisms to construct equal-opportunity policies for resource allocation. In our 
model agents enjoy welfare as a function of the effort they expend, and the amount of a 
socially provided resource they consume. Nevertheless, agents have interdependent 
preferences, i.e., they not only care about their own allocation, but also about their peers' 
allocations. As in the standard approach to equality of opportunity, the aim is to allocate the 
social resource so that welfare across individuals at the same relative effort level is as equal as 
possible. We show how pursuing this same aim while assuming that agents have 
interdependent preferences might crucially alter the results. 
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1 Introduction
Distributive justice concerns the fair distribution of social welfare among
the citizens of a society. Probably, the most universally supported concep-
tion of distributive justice is that of equality of opportunity. Traditionally,
equality of opportunity was understood as the absence of legal bar to ac-
cess to education, to all positions and jobs, and the fact that all hiring was
meritocratic. From the 70’s, several authors, most notably, John Rawls
(e.g., Rawls, 1971), Amartya Sen (e.g., Sen, 1980) and Ronald Dworkin
(e.g., Dworkin, 1981a; 1981b), started calling for a more radical notion of
equality of opportunity. Nowadays, it is well accepted that real equality of
opportunity requires compensating individuals for aspects of their situation
for which they are not responsible (and that hamper their achievement of
whatever is valuable in life) but only for those (differences between aspects
of their situations for which they are responsible should not be a concern
for justice).
John Roemer (e.g., Roemer, 1993, 1998) has formalized a precise (and
quite influential) notion of equality of opportunity in order to resolve dis-
tributive issues.1 In a pure distribution context, a policy reduces to a pro-
posal for the allocation of some finite amount of resource, across types of
individuals, where the resource is to be interpreted as the instrument to
achieve a certain objective. Roemer postulates that an equal-opportunity
policy, with respect to an objective, should allocate the resource so that it
makes the degree to which an individual achieves the objective a function
only of her effort (i.e., aspects that influence the individual’s status but over
which she has at least some control), and therefore independent of her cir-
cumstances (i.e., aspects beyond the individual’s control that also influence
her status).
Roemer’s mechanism is constructed under the standard assumption in
most economic models that all people are exclusively motivated by their
material self-interest (the so-called self-interest hypothesis). That is, in his
model, Roemer assumes that agents have ”independent preferences”, hence
only caring about their own allocations. In recent years, however, there has
been experimental and field evidence systematically refuting the self-interest
hypothesis and suggesting that many people are strongly motivated by oth-
ers’ preferences and that concerns for fairness and reciprocity cannot be
ignored in social interactions (e.g., Guth et al., 1982; Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr
1It is worth noting that Roemer’s theory has a broader range of applications although
we shall restrict our attention here to the pure distribution context, for ease of exposition.
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and Gachter, 2000). As a result, several models that relax the assumption
of individual greed, upon expanding the notion of preferences, to account
for the above evidence, have been proposed (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). A feature that most of these models share
is that individuals dislike payoff inequality and that individual preferences
also depend on the payoff of others.
If a social planner cares about equality of opportunity, it seems reason-
able to assume that (at least, some) agents do too.2 An agent caring about
equality of opportunity is likely to care about social goals per se and not just
about material self-interest. Therefore, in order to design equal-opportunity
policies, it makes sense to assume that agents have interdependent prefer-
ences instead of self-interest (independent) preferences. This is indeed the
aim of this paper. That is, to explore the design of equal-opportunity policies
in the event in which individuals not only care about their own allocation,
but also about their peers’ allocations, where here peer is interpreted as an
equally deserving (in terms of relative effort) individual. We shall formal-
ize a suitable mechanism for the design of equal-opportunity policies in this
context and will highlight how the assumption of interdependent preferences
can make a difference with respect to the standard approach to equality of
opportunity. Our mechanism will be mostly framed as an extension to Roe-
mer’s original mechanism. As we shall see later, it can also be easily adapted
to account for the suitable extension of a different, but somewhat related,
mechanism developed by Dirk Van de gaer (e.g., Van de gaer, 1993; Ooghe
et al., 2007).3
The related literature to this paper can be divided into two broad cate-
gories.
On the one hand, the literature on compensation and responsibility in
fair allocation rules (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) or Fleurbaey (2008)
for excellent surveys). This literature deals with two antagonistic principles
(to neutralize the influence over agents’ outcomes of the characteristics that
elicit compensation, and to do nothing about inequalities entailed by other
characteristics) typically modeled by axioms which are logically indepen-
dent, and even sometimes substantially incompatible. The main issue then
is to solve the ethical dilemma of how to balance these two principles in the
social allocation of resources. The mechanism presented in this paper can
2Except, perhaps, if the social planner endorses the enlightened despotism’ maxim
”everything for the people, nothing by the people”.
3Van de gaer’s mechanism focuses on the opportunity sets (i.e., sets of available out-
comes) of equally-deserving individuals in different types, rather than focusing on their
actual outcomes (as Roemer’s mechanism does).
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be considered as a step in that direction.4
On the other hand, the literature on interdependent preferences (see
Fehr and Schmidt (2003) or Sobel (2005) for excellent surveys). As men-
tioned above, research on interdependent preferences mostly originated to
give account of the growing empirical and experimental evidence that hu-
man behavior could not be explained only by the hypothesis of self-interested
material payoff maximization. In this paper, we make use of one of the (suc-
cessful) existing models accounting for this evidence so that the design of
equal-opportunity policies becomes more accurate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the preliminaries of the model. In Section 3, we present the standard and
new mechanisms to construct equal-opportunity policies. In Section 4, we
provide an application to obtain equal-opportunity policies in the context
of health care delivery. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a population whose members enjoy welfare as a result of the
amount of a socially provided resource they consume, and the amount of
effort they expend. The amount of effort an individual expends comes deter-
mined, not only by her autonomous volition, but also by her circumstances.
We assume there is a fixed set of circumstances and let T = {1, ..., n} be the
set of resulting types, in which the population is exhaustively partitioned
(i.e., two individuals in the same type share the same profile of circum-
stances, whereas individuals in different types have different profiles). Each
type is characterized by a function denoted ut(·, ·) representing the material
welfare of an individual of type t, as a function of the amount of the resource
she consumes and the effort she expends. We assume that these utility
functions are fully interpersonally comparable. That is, ut(x, e) ≥ ut′(x′, e′)
means that an individual in type t, who receives an amount of resource x
and expends a level of effort e, enjoys at least the same material welfare
4To be more precise, the mechanism in this paper refers to the so-called utilitarian-
reward approach to equality of opportunity (also adopted by Roemer and Van de gaer)
which postulates that the social objective is to maximize the sum of individual outcomes,
once the undue influence of characteristics calling for compensation has properly been
taken into account. There is an opposite approach based on the libertarian principle
that if all agents were identical in the characteristics which elicit compensation, there
would be no reason to make any transfer between the agents (the so-called natural-reward
principle). See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2004) or Fleurbaey (2008) for further scrutiny
of both reward principles, as well as their connections with the principle of compensation.
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level than an individual in type t′, who receives an amount of resource x′
and expends a level of effort e′.5
Suppose that there exists an amount ω (per capita) of the resource to
allocate among individuals in the population. The issue is to determine how
to allocate ω properly to achieve equality of opportunity. For each t ∈ T ,
let ϕt : R+ 7−→ R+ be the function that indicates the amount of resource
that an individual of type t receives with respect to the effort she expends.
An n−tuple ϕ = (ϕ1, ..., ϕn) of such functions will be called a policy and
each of its components ϕt will be called an allocation rule. Let Φ be the set
of available policies.
Suppose that the distribution of effort expended by members of type t
is given by the probability measure F tϕt . Let e
t(pi, ϕt) be the level of effort
expended by the individual at the pith quantile of that effort distribution.
Formally, et(pi, ϕt) is such that
pi =
∫ et(pi,ϕt)
0
dF tϕt .
Now, we define the indirect material utility function vt(pi, ϕt), i.e., the level
of material welfare enjoyed by an individual of type t who reached the pith
degree of effort and faced the allocation rule ϕt, as follows:
vt(pi, ϕt) = ut(ϕt(et(pi, ϕt)), et(pi, ϕt)).
Let pi ∈ [0, 1] and ϕ = (ϕ1, ..., ϕn) ∈ Φ be given and consider
v(pi, ϕ) = (v1(pi, ϕ1), v2(pi, ϕ2), ..., vn(pi, ϕn))
the vector of indirect material utilities of the individuals at the pith degree
of effort of each type, after implementing policy ϕ.
Now, we also assume that individuals enjoy immaterial welfare that
comes determined by their peers’ material welfare levels, where here ’peers’
refers to agents that are equally deserving, i.e., agents expending a compa-
rable level of effort.6 In other words, individuals are not necessarily purely
selfish subjects and they might dislike inequitable outcomes for individu-
als who are equally deserving. As modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
5For instance, think of the case of future earning power as a function of the (per
capita) expenditure in education and years of schooling. Also, think of life expectancy, or
the number of QALYs, as a function of the (per capita) health care expenditure and the
life style (e.g., smoking behavior, physical exercise, etc.)
6Here, and following Roemer (1998), comparable effort will refer to the same relative
effort level, i.e., the same quantile at the corresponding effort distribution.
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we assume that, in general, individuals suffer more from inequity that is
to their material disadvantage than from inequity that is to their material
advantage. Formally, let V t(·, ·) denote the function representing the overall
(material and immaterial) welfare of an individual of type t, as a function
of her quantile at the type’s effort distribution and the policy being imple-
mented. Then, for pi ∈ [0, 1] and ϕ = (ϕ1, ..., ϕn) ∈ Φ, we have
V t(pi, ϕ) = vt(pi, ϕt)
− α
t
n− 1
∑
s∈T\{t}
max{vs(pi, ϕs)− vt(pi, ϕt), 0}
− β
t
n− 1
∑
s∈T\{t}
max{vt(pi, ϕt)− vs(pi, ϕs), 0},
where αt ≥ max{0, βt}. Note that the first term measures the utility loss
from disadvantageous inequality, while the second term measures the loss
from advantageous inequality. Furthermore, the assumption αt ≥ βt cap-
tures the idea that an individual suffers more from inequality that is to her
disadvantage. Note also that we do not impose the standard assumption
of βt ≥ 0, as we do not want to rule out from the outset the existence of
subjects who like to be better off than their peers.
3 The mechanisms
The issue now is to construct a mechanism that yields for each environment
a particular policy in Φ. For a given quantile pi of effort expended, suppose
we are only concerned with equalizing the advantage of all individual, across
types, who expended the pith degree of effort. For this case, Roemer (1998,
page 27) proposes to select the policy that maximizes the minimum level of
material advantage of these individuals. Formally,
ϕpi = arg max
ϕ∈Φ
min
t∈T
{vt(pi, ϕt)}. (1)
If, instead, the goal would be adjusted to consider immaterial advantage
too, the program would become
ϕ̂pi = arg max
ϕ∈Φ
min
t∈T
{V t(pi, ϕ)}. (2)
At the risk of stressing the obvious, note that whereas program (1) is
only concerned with the material advantage achieved by the worst-off in-
dividual, out of those at the same (relative) level of effort, program (2)
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is concerned with the whole distribution of material advantage within the
group. It is also worth noting, nonetheless, that if we assume αt = βt = 0,
for all t ∈ T , in program (2), then we obtain program (1), which shows
that program (2) is indeed a generalization of program (1), to account for
possible interdependent preferences.
Now, if we wish to equalize advantage across types for every pi, either
using program (1) or program (2), we would have in general a continuum of
different policies, {ϕpi : pi ∈ [0, 1]} or {ϕ̂pi : pi ∈ [0, 1]}. If, by chance, all the
programs would provide the same policy, that would be, unambiguously,
the equal-opportunity policy recommended. In general, this will not be
the case and therefore we need to adopt a compromise solution. To do so,
Roemer (1998) proposes a modification of program (1) upon replacing the
maximandum for a social objective function consisting of the average of the
maximanda in each of the programs. More precisely,
ϕR = arg max
ϕ∈Φ
∫ 1
0
min
t∈T
{vt(pi, ϕ)}dpi. (3)
The analogous extension of our proposal would generate the following pro-
gram:
ϕ̂ = arg max
ϕ∈Φ
∫ 1
0
min
t∈T
{V t(pi, ϕ)}dpi. (4)
As mentioned above, there is a similar approach to equality of opportu-
nity that focuses on the opportunity sets to which people have access (rather
than their outcomes), and tries to make these sets as equal as possible (e.g.,
Van de gaer, 1993; Ooghe et al., 2007). Formally, for ϕ ∈ Φ, let vϕ be the
average of the indirect (material) utilities of each type at each degree of
effort, after implementing ϕ, i.e.,
vϕ =
(∫ 1
0
v1(pi, ϕ1) · dpi, ...,
∫ 1
0
vn(pi, ϕn) · dpi
)
.
Each component of the representative vector vϕ can be interpreted as the
opportunity set of each type. Then, Van de gaer’s mechanism amounts to
the following program:
ϕV = arg max
ϕ∈Φ
min
t∈T
{∫ 1
0
vt(pi, ϕt) · dpi
}
. (5)
The counterpart mechanism for interdependent preferences would then be
the following:
ϕ̂V = arg max
ϕ∈Φ
min
t∈T
{∫ 1
0
V t(pi, ϕ) · dpi
}
. (6)
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3.1 A particular case
For ease of exposition, and in order to gain some insight on the effect of
interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies, let
us focus now on the two-type case. Formally, let T = {1, 2}. For pi ∈ [0, 1]
and ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ Φ, we have
V 1(pi, ϕ) = v1(pi, ϕ1)
− α1 max{v2(pi, ϕ2)− v1(pi, ϕ1), 0}
− β1 max{v1(pi, ϕ1)− v2(pi, ϕ2), 0},
where α1 ≥ max{0, β1}, and,
V 2(pi, ϕ) = v2(pi, ϕ2)
− α2 max{v1(pi, ϕ1)− v2(pi, ϕ2), 0}
− β2 max{v2(pi, ϕ2)− v1(pi, ϕ1), 0},
where α2 ≥ max{0, β2}.
Let us now assume that type 1 is handicapped with respect to type 2,
i.e., for any ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ Φ given, v1(pi, ϕ1) ≤ v2(pi, ϕ2) for all pi ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, the above expressions become
V 1(pi, ϕ) = v1(pi, ϕ1)− α1(v2(pi, ϕ2)− v1(pi, ϕ1)),
and
V 2(pi, ϕ) = v2(pi, ϕ2)− β2(v2(pi, ϕ2)− v1(pi, ϕ1)).
Then, it is straightforward to show that, for ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) ∈ Φ and pi ∈ [0, 1]
given, V 1(pi, ϕ) ≤ V 2(pi, ϕ) if and only if α1 ≥ β2 − 1. Therefore, program
(4) would become
max
ϕ∈Φ
(1 + α1)
∫ 1
0
v1(pi, ϕ)dpi − α1
∫ 1
0
v2(pi, ϕ)dpi, (7)
for the case in which α1 ≥ β2 − 1, and
max
ϕ∈Φ
β2
∫ 1
0
v1(pi, ϕ)dpi + (1− β2)
∫ 1
0
v2(pi, ϕ)dpi, (8)
for the case in which α1 ≤ β2 − 1. Program (7), however, would become
max
ϕ∈Φ
∫ 1
0
v1(pi, ϕ)dpi, (9)
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which clearly highlights the differences in policy recommendations between
the case of interdependent preferences and the case of independent prefer-
ences.
For instance, it is not difficult to show that if the average (material)
advantage of the handicapped group (i.e.,
∫ 1
0 v
1(pi, ϕ)dpi) is a single-peaked
function with respect to ϕ, whereas the average (material) advantage of the
other group (i.e.,
∫ 1
0 v
2(pi, ϕ)dpi) is an increasing function with respect to ϕ
(as it will be the case for the illustration in the next section), then we have
that the resulting equal-opportunity policy upon assuming interdependent
preferences (i.e., the solution to program (7), or to program (8)) gives more
priority to the handicapped group than the resulting equal-opportunity pol-
icy upon assuming independent preferences (i.e., the solution to program
(9)).7
4 An illustration: equal-opportunity policies for
health care
We show in this section, by means of a stylized example, that when it comes
to design equal-opportunity policies, considering interdependent preferences
can make a difference. This example comes from Roemer (2002) and it is
presented here with some slight modifications.8 It consists of a framework
to select equal-opportunity policies for the delivery of health care resources.
Assume a society with two types of individuals, the rich and the poor,
where we suppose that a person is not to be held accountable for her so-
cioeconomic status in regard to her health. Let us say that one half of the
population is poor whilst the other half is rich. The rich have, on average,
more healthy life styles than the poor. This is formalized by assuming that
the poor have life-style qualities uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1],
while the rich have life-style qualities that are uniformly distributed on the
interval [0.5, 1.5].
We suppose that members of the population die from cancer or tubercu-
losis. The probability of contracting cancer, as a function of life-style quality
(q), is the same for both types, and given by:
ρCR (q) = ρ
C
P (q) = 1−
2q
3
whereas the probability of contracting tuberculosis is only positive for the
7For a study of the ethics of priority see Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006).
8See also Moreno-Ternero (2007).
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poor people and given by:
ρTP (q) = 1−
q
3
In particular, the rich do not contract tuberculosis at all. Suppose that life
expectancy for a rich individual has the following expression:
LER =
{
70 if cancer is not contracted,
60 + 10xc−1000xc+1000 if cancer is contracted and xc is spent on its treatment.
Thus, if the disease is contracted, life expectancy will lie between 50 and
70, depending on how much is spent on treatment (from zero to an infinite
amount). This is a simple way of modeling the fact that nobody dies of
cancer before age 50, that life expectancy increases as resources spent in-
crease and approaches 70 if resources spent become infinite. Suppose that
life expectancy for a poor individual is
LEP =

70 if neither disease is contracted,
60 + 10xc−1000xc+1000 if cancer is contracted and xc is spent on its treatment.
50 + 20xt−10000xt+10000 if tuberculosis is contracted and xt is spent on it.
min
{
60 + 10xc−1000xc+1000 , 50 + 20
xt−10000
xt+10000
}
if both diseases are contracted.
Thus, the poor can die at age 30 if they contract tuberculosis and it is not
treated. With large expenditures, an individual who contracts tuberculosis
can live to age 70. We also assume that if a poor individual contracts both
cancer and tuberculosis then her life expectancy will be the minimum of the
above two numbers.
Finally, assume that national health care budget is $4000 per capita.
The instrument is (xc, xt), the schedule of how much will be spent on
treating an occurrence of each disease. The objective is to equalize oppor-
tunities, for the rich and the poor, for life expectancy.
With the data mentioned above, one can easily compute that 1/3 of the
rich will contract cancer, 1/9 of the poor will contract only cancer, 5/18 of
the poor will contract only tuberculosis and 5/9 of the poor will contract
both tuberculosis and cancer. Hence, the budget constraint can be expressed
as (
1
2
· 1
3
+
1
2
· 2
3
)
xc +
1
2
· 5
6
· xt = 4000
or equivalently, 6xc + 5xt = 48000.
It is also straightforward to see that the probability that individuals at
quantile pi of their effort distribution contract a disease is:
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CANCER TUBERCULOSIS
RICH 1− 23 (pi + 0.5) 0
POOR 1− 23pi 1− pi3
Thus, life expectancies are
vR (pi, xc) =
2
3
(pi + 0.5) · 70 +
(
2
3
(1− pi)
)(
60 + 10
xc − 1000
xc + 1000
)
and
vP (pi, xc, xt) =
2pi2
9
· 70 + (1− pi
3
)
2pi
3
(
50 + 20
xt − 10000
xt + 10000
)
+
(1− 2pi
3
)
pi
3
(
60 + 10
xc − 1000
xc + 1000
)
+
(1− pi
3
)(1− 2pi
3
) min
{
60 + 10
xc − 1000
xc + 1000
, 50 + 20
xt − 10000
xt + 10000
}
The solution that Roemer’s mechanism would propose for this example is
obtained by solving the problem:
max{xc,xt}
{∫ 1
0 min{vR (pi, xc) , vP (pi, xc, xt)} · dpi
}
s.t. 6xc + 5xt = 48000
It can be shown that, for (xc, xt) given, vR (pi, xc) ≥ vP (pi, xc, xt) for all
pi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the above program becomes
max{xc,xt}
{∫ 1
0 vP (pi, xc, xt) · dpi
}
s.t. 6xc + 5xt = 48000
whose solution turns out to be
(xRc , x
R
t ) = ($310, $9230),
i.e., $310 spent in the treatment of cancer and $9230 in the treatment of
tuberculosis.9
9Note that this would also be the solution that Van de gaer’s mechanism would pro-
pose here, as it would amount to solve the same problem given that, in this example,
opportunity sets do not cross (e.g., Ooghe et al., 2007).
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Let us now assume that individuals have interdependent preferences.
That is, they not only care about their life expectancies, but also about
their peers’ life expectancy, where here ’peers’ refers to agents at the same
quantile of their corresponding life-style distributions. Formally, let
VP (pi, xc, xt) = vP (pi, xc, xt)
− αP max{vR (pi, xc)− vP (pi, xc, xt) , 0}
− βP max{vP (pi, xc, xt)− vR (pi, xc) , 0},
where αP ≥ max{βP , 0}, and
VR (pi, xc, xt) = vR (pi, xc)
− αR max{vP (pi, xc, xt)− vR (pi, xc) , 0}
− βR max{vR (pi, xc)− vP (pi, xc, xt) , 0},
where αR ≥ max{βR, 0}.
Since, for (xc, xt) given, vR (pi, xc) ≥ vP (pi, xc, xt) for all pi ∈ [0, 1], we
have the following:
VP (pi, xc, xt) = vP (pi, xc, xt)− αP (vR (pi, xc)− vP (pi, xc, xt))
and
VR (pi, xc, xt) = vR (pi, xc)− βR(vR (pi, xc)− vP (pi, xc, xt))
For these preferences, program (4) translates into
max{xc,xt}
{∫ 1
0 min{VP (pi, xc, xt) , VR (pi, xc)} · dpi
}
s.t. 6xc + 5xt = 48000
Let us assume first that αP ≥ βR − 1. Then, it follows that, for (xc, xt)
given, VR (pi, xc, xt) ≥ VP (pi, xc, xt) for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, program (4)
translates into
max{xc,xt}
{∫ 1
0 VP (pi, xc, xt) · dpi
}
s.t. 6xc + 5xt = 48000
Equivalently,
max{xc,xt}
{
(1 + αP )
∫ 1
0 vP (pi, xc, xt)− αP
∫ 1
0 vR (pi, xc) · dpi
}
s.t. 6xc + 5xt = 48000
Obviously, for αP = 0 this program becomes Roemer’s original program.
For αP > 0, however, we have different programs and different solutions.
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More precisely, let α̂ = 0.13842. Then, it turns out that for αP ≥ α̂ the
solution is given by
(xc, xt) = ($0, $9600)
i.e., everything is spent in the treatment of tuberculosis. For 0 < αP < α̂, the
corresponding programs have αP−specific solutions (xc, xt) = (xαPc , xαPt ),
moving from Roemer’s solution to the above solution. Figure 1 plots all of
them as a function of αP .
Insert Figure 1 about here
If we now assume that αP ≤ βR − 1, results do not change. More precisely,
under this assumption, VR (pi, xc, xt) ≤ VP (pi, xc, xt) for all pi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
program (4) translates into
max{xc,xt}
{
βR
∫ 1
0 vP (pi, xc, xt) + (1− βR)
∫ 1
0 vR (pi, xc) · dpi
}
s.t. 6xc + 5xt = 48000
Then, for βR = 1, which is the lowest possible value for βR (and equivalent
to the case in which αP = 0) under the assumption αP ≤ βR − 1, this
program becomes Roemer’s original program. For βR ≥ 1 + α̂ = 1.13842,
the solution is given by
(xc, xt) = ($0, $9600)
i.e., everything is spent in the treatment of tuberculosis. For 1 < βR <
1.13842, the corresponding programs have βR−specific solutions that coin-
cide with the αP−specific solutions described above.10 Thus, no new solu-
tions emerge under the assumption αP ≤ βR − 1.
In summary, we obtain that, for this example, all possible solutions under
the assumption of interdependent preferences involve a higher expenditure
on the disease which is specific to the poor type than under the assumption
of selfish preferences. Formally, xc < xRc and xt > x
R
t .
11
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the policy in which everything
is spent in the treatment of tuberculosis is precisely the so-called Rawlsian
policy (i.e., the policy that maximizes the condition of the worst-off individ-
ual) for this example. Formally, the Rawlsian policy is given by the program
ϕRW = arg max
ϕ∈Φ
min
(t,pi)∈T×[0,1]
{vt(pi, ϕ)}.
10More precisely, for 1 < βR < 1.13842, (x
βR
c , x
βR
t ) = (x
1+αP
c , x
1+αP
t ).
11This feature is also obtained under more general conditions, as mentioned in Section
3.1.
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It is not difficult to show that the solution of this program, for the example
of this section, is obtained by solving the problem:
max{xc,xt} {vP (0, xc, xt)}
s.t. 6xc + 5xt = 48000
whose solution turns out to be (xRWc , x
RW
t ) = ($0, $9600). Therefore, a small
degree of inequity aversion in individuals’ preferences is enough to guarantee
a broad consensus on the Rawlsian solution, at least for this problem.
5 Discussion
Equality of opportunity amounts to combine the idea of compensation with
the concept of responsibility for the design of policies. Roemer’s theory of
equality of opportunity is a very important contribution in this direction,
providing perhaps the first workable proposal (in an economic model) to
design equal-opportunity policies, by means of a precise balance between
the ideas of compensation and responsibility.12 The theory assumes the so-
called self-interest hypothesis, by which all individuals are assumed to be ex-
clusively pursuing their material self-interest without caring about ”social”
goals per se. In this paper, we have argued that interdependent preferences
(which have proven to be useful in explaining several puzzles arising under
the self-interest hypothesis) might be more consonant with the idea of equal-
ity of opportunity. We have also shown that the counterpart mechanism to
Roemer’s original mechanism, extended to incorporate interdependent pref-
erences, might yield recommendations that are significantly different.
It is worth remarking that the introduction of interdependent prefer-
ences in the model we have considered does not preclude the existence of
agents obeying the standard economic assumptions of rationality and indi-
vidual greed. One of the insights of some of the newly developed theoretical
models with interdependent preferences is to argue that the interaction be-
tween fair and selfish individuals is key to understand the observed behavior
in strategic settings (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). These models explain why in some strategic settings almost all peo-
ple behave as if they are completely selfish, while in others the same people
will behave as if they are driven by fairness. In this respect, our mechanism
is a generalization of Roemer’s (and also Van de gaer’s) mechanism, which
12Other important contributions balancing the ideas of compensation and responsibility
in a general framework, as well as in applications, have recently appeared in the literature
(e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2004; 2006; Ooghe et al., 2007; Fleurbaey, 2008).
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can be seen as an extreme case in which all agents in the model are selfish.
Our mechanism, however, allows for more realistic situations in which indi-
viduals do care about social goals, such as fairness in the allocation process,
relative deprivation, and status seeking.
A somewhat related modification to Roemer’s (and also Van de gaer’s)
approach to the design of equal-opportunity policies has also been recently
proposed (e.g., Moreno-Ternero, 2007). In this case, the idea is to rec-
ommend the policy that minimize the inequality (according to a certain
inequality index) of welfare across individuals that are equally deserving.
In doing so, a concern for relative deprivation and status seeking is cap-
tured, albeit without imposing interdependent preferences in the model.
Interestingly enough, the case in which the maximin inequality index is
considered gives rise to a mechanism that can be derived from Roemer’s
(and also Van de gaer’s) mechanism upon assuming interdependent prefer-
ences, provided there is a sufficiently high concern for inequality aversion
(see Moreno-Ternero (2007) for further details).
We have also provided in this paper an application of these mechanisms
to the case of designing equal-opportunity policies for the finance of health
care in a stylized example. We have shown in this example that a small
concern for equity, among equally deserving agents, is enough to recommend
more radical solutions than the ones advocated by Roemer’s (and Van de
gaer’s) mechanism, even leading to the Rawlsian recommendation for this
setting. Rawlsian policies have often been criticized for being too extreme as
a result of not invoking any concern for individual responsibility. Our results,
however, show that Rawlsian recommendations can actually be supported by
a responsibility-sensitive theory of egalitarianism, such as the one proposed
in this paper.
This work leaves two main routes for further research. On the one hand,
it would be desirable to provide general (analytical) results extending the
features highlighted in the application presented in this paper. For instance,
to characterize the domains in which the equal-opportunity policies obtained
under the assumption of interdependent preferences are more egalitarian
than in the case of selfish preferences, or the domains in which the equal-
opportunity policies with interdependent preferences lead to the Rawlsian
recommendation. On the other hand, it would be interesting to explore an
alternative interpretation of the model in which agents are assumed to care
about their peers’ allocation, where peer now is interpreted as individuals at
the same type (i.e., with the same set of circumstances) rather than at the
same level (or degree) of effort, which might be an interpretation more in
tune with Van de gaer’s approach to the design of equal-opportunity policies.
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